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 !irty-Six hours a"er the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that #"een 
of the nineteen hijackers, and the mastermind behind the attack (Osama bin Laden), were of Saudi Arabian origin. Fearing 
backlash that could threaten its relationship with, and economic interests in, the United States, the Saudi Arabian government 
immediately hired Burson-Marsteller, a public relations (PR) agency. !e #rm moved swi"ly, placing two print advertise-
ments, which expressed condolences from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, in twenty major American newspapers. !e 
Embassy’s choice of this particular #rm reveals how severe it perceived the situation to be. Burson-Marsteller has a reputation 
of representing companies and individuals in crisis:
“When Blackwater killed those seventeen Iraqi civilians in Baghdad, they called Burson-Marsteller. 
When there was a nuclear meltdown at !ree-Mile Island, Babcock and Wilcox, who built that plant, 
called Burson-Marsteller. !e Bhopal chemical disaster that killed thousands of people in India, Union 
Carbide called Burson-Marsteller. Romanian dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu—Burson-Marsteller. !e 
government of Saudi Arabia, three days a"er 9/11 -- Burson-Marsteller.” 1
 1 “!e Rachel Maddow Show,” MSNBC,  March 5, 2009.
2 “!e great escape,” Salon, December 11, 2009, http://dir.salon.com/story/books/feature/2004/03/11/unger_1.
 In addition to the print ads, Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United 
States, went on a media tour giving interviews to major television networks.2  With the investigation ongoing, he was careful 
with his word choice. While he con#rmed that Osama bin Laden is “Saudi,” he made sure to clarify that his citizenship had 
been revoked for some time.  
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He also avoided speaking about the origins of the hijackers; instead opting for,
“We in the kingdom, the government and the people of Saudi Arabia, refuse to have any person 
a!liated with terrorism to be connected to our country ... We in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are fully 
prepared to cooperate with you in every matter conducive to revealing the identity of the perpetrators 
of this criminal act.” 3
3 “Crown Prince Abdullah condoles American people,” "e Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, accessed November 15, 2009, http://208.246.28.155/2001News/
News/NewsDetail.asp?cIndex=3165.
4 Uthman, Al-Rawwaf, “Linking Saudi Arabia with Terrorism: "e Anti-Saudi Media Campaign,” World Press Review, last modi#ed October 30, 2001, accessed 
May 18 , 2011, http://www.worldpress.org/europe/0102alsharq.htm.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 “Strengthening the U.S.-Saudi Relationship (A CFR Paper),” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed November 16, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publica-
tion/8667/strengthening_the_ussaudi_relationship_a_cfr_paper.html.
8 “CounterPunch: Edited by Alexander Cockburn and Je$rey St. Clair,” CounterPunch, accessed November 15, 2009, http://www.counterpunch.org/ramp-
ton07312003.html.
9  “Washington DC based National Public Relations Advertising Interactive Agency - Qorvis Communications,” Qorvis Communications, accessed  December 
1, 2009, http://www.qorvis.com/driving_results/saudi_arabia.html.
10 “WorldNetDaily: Saudi PR machine greased by millions,” WorldNetDaily, accessed December 2, 2009, http://70.85.195.205/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_
ID=30240.
11 “USATODAY.com - O!cial: 15 of 19 Sept. 11 hijackers were Saudi,” USA Today, accessed December 1, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/
world/2002/02/06/saudi.htm.
"is brief campaign did little, if anything, to improve the Saudi image in the United States, and extensive press coverage of the 
Kingdom’s link to Al Qaeda and various aspects of the 9/11 plot further in%uenced public opinion (see Gallup poll, below). 
Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz expressed his concern surrounding the media’s treatment of the Kingdom, 
in an October 30, 2001 meeting with academics and journalists, and, “expounded upon the important responsibility that 
intellectual, cultural, and media experts must bear in responding to and countering this media war against Saudi Arabia.”4  In 
writing about this meeting, Saudi journalists for the London-based Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper, Othman Al-Rawwaf, noted: 
“We need to know what exactly they are claiming about the Kingdom in their spurious media 
campaign. And why does this campaign comprise absurd slanders and incorrect accusations? And 
#nally, how is it possible to face this campaign and counter it?”5
Al-Rawwaf asserted this “campaign” had three primary messages used to indirectly tie Saudi Arabia to extremism:
  have helped the United States’ e$orts to combat terrorism),
6
He claimed this American and European media campaign targeted his country because Saudi Arabia was in a unique position 
to in%uence American policy towards Palestine, but neglected to mention that the in%uence actually stretched much further 
into oil supplies/prices and investments in American companies of almost $700 billion.7 Al-Rawwaf, however, did suggest that 
coming up with their own media campaign was the best way to counter negative United States/European coverage.
 In line with this advice, the Saudi Arabia Embassy hired Qorvis Communications, a Washington, D.C.-based media 
relations #rm, to conduct polling, lobbying, and communications for $200,000 in monthly retainer fees.8  "e overarching goal 
was, “to rebuild and emphasize the importance of the longstanding and historic relationship between the Saudi and American 
people and governments.”9  Given the scope and budget for this client, Qorvis subcontracted some responsibilities to their 
a!liates, including Patton Boggs (law-lobbying) and Sandler-Innocenzi (media buying). "e SAE also chose to hire additional 
PR and lobbying #rms to handle their parallel campaign promoting Saudi business interests. All in all, Qorvis received $14.6 
million over the course of six months.10 
 While the media campaign didn’t commence until the middle of April 2002, the government started image 
rehabilitation e$orts in February, right a&er Saudi Arabia o!cially acknowledged, on February 6, 2002, that #&een of the 9/11 
hijackers were, in fact, their citizens.11  "e timing was also in line with the release of initial Gallup Poll results showing that 
sixty-four percent of Americans held “unfavorable” views of Saudi Arabia (up from forty-six percent in February 2001) [Figure 
1].
 "is #rst e$ort was to dra& and publicize a traditional diplomacy plan that would create peace between the Arab-
world and Israel. "e Saudi Peace Initiative (later re-named “Arab Peace Initiative”) proposed normalized relations between 
the Arab world and Israel in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories.
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http://www.gallup.com/poll/116308/americans-support-israel-unchanged-gaza-con!ict.aspx
Figure 1
 "e exact origins of the initiative are fuzzy, but, o#cially, it’s recognized that "omas Friedman published an opinion 
piece (op-ed) in on February 6, 2002 (the same day hijacker acknowledgement) in which he suggested a similar “land for 
peace” scenario. On February 17, 2002, Friedman published a second op-ed where he explains that he was summoned to Saudi 
Arabia to meet with Crown Prince Abdullah. He used the opportunity to explain his thoughts to the Prince: “A$er I laid out 
this idea, the crown prince looked at me with mock astonishment and said, ‘Have you broken into my desk?’”12 "e prince 
then went on to tell Friedman that he had already composed a speech detailing an identical initiative, and that he planned to 
present it at the Arab League summit, held in Beirut at the end of March. 
 Not to discredit Friedman and his Middle East expertise, but the timing of his proposal and subsequent meeting with 
the prince is almost too convenient to be coincidental. It’s possible that Qorvis orchestrated, at least in part, Friedman’s visit, 
and, if true, it would be very sophisticated public diplomacy (PD) – whether or not the journalist was aware of it. "ere are 
a couple other clues in the February 17th op-ed that suggest this may be the case. "e %rst is when Friedman reveals why he 
went to the country: “I am currently in Saudi Arabia on a visit -- part of the Saudi opening to try to explain themselves better 
to the world in light of the fact that %$een Saudis were involved in the [9/11] attacks.”13  "is wording certainly has the ring 
of PD, and it suggests he is there as part of a deliberate communication strategy. "e second clue is a statement o&ered by the 
prince:
‘’We have been close friends for so long, and we never expected Americans to doubt us,’’ he said. ‘’We 
saw this attack by bin Laden and his men as an attack on us, too, and an attempt to damage the U.S.-
Saudi relationship,’’ and ‘’[w]e were deeply saddened by it and we never expected it to lead to tensions 
between us. But we’ve now learned that we respond to events di&erently. … It is never too late to 
express our regrets.’’14
12 “An Intriguing Signal From the Saudi Crown Prince,” !e New York Times, last modi%ed February 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/17/opinion/an-
intriguing-signal-from-the-saudi-crown-prince.html.
13 "omas L. Friedman, “An Intriguing Signal From the Saudi Crown Prince - New York Times.” !e New York Times, last modi%ed  February 17, 2002, ac-
cessed  June 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/17/opinion/an-intriguing-signal-from-the-saudi-crown-prince.html.
14 Ibid.
 15“Saudi Arabia’s Op-Ed Diplomacy: A Public Relations Ploy or a Serious Initiative?” Jerusalem Center for Public A&airs (JCPA), last modi%ed March 2002, 
accessed May 18, 2011, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&PID=2404&IID=819.
 "e tone was substantially di&erent from that of previous, defensive statements coming from Saudi Arabian o#cials. 
"e prince cra$ed a kinder and gentler image that dovetailed well with the Peace Initiative by reinforcing the idea that the 
Kingdom is making positive changes.
 Major newspapers around the world reported on the Saudi Peace Initiative, temporarily re-framing the media’s focus. 
One website noted, “It is rare in international diplomacy that so much credit has been given to a single government for a peace 
initiative that has not yet been made.”15  Had the government chosen to issue a press release about the plan, it would not have 
resulted in the same buzz. Publicizing it in the form of an op-ed made the Initiative seem spontaneous and natural, which is 
more exciting than a formal announcement. 
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16 “Audio Recording of Saudi Arabia Radio Spot,” Sastian, accessed December 2, 2009, http://sastian.com/taxonomy/term/9?from=28.
17 “Saudi Arabia Launches P.R. Campaign in U.S.,” Fox News, accessed December 1, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,51584,00.html.
18 “Electronic Media Online,” Internet Archive, accessed November 20, 2009, http://web.archive.org/web/20020601103504/http://emonline.com/
topstorys/042902saudi.html.
If the government had any hopes of making an impact with their formal media campaign, they needed to make this space. 
!e campaign started slowly with one, sixty-second radio spot, which "rst aired on April 18, 2002 in a few markets.
 Additionally, allowing a third party to #oat an idea to the media keeps the message creator clear of criticism if it 
isn’t received well. Most importantly, the Initiative created space for another message to get through in the media. For the 
"rst time in "ve months, reports and follow-up op-eds showcased a #exible, “peacemaking” Saudi Arabia that was open to 
communication, rather than the oppressive “sponsor of terrorism” image that had been so prevalent.  In April 2002, ABC 
News polled Americans regarding their support for initiative:
“Read the editorials if you want opinions. Listen to America’s leaders if you want the facts. President 
Bush has called Saudi Arabia, ‘nothing but cooperative,’ in the war on terrorism. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell says the Saudis have ‘been responsive on all of the things that we have asked them to do.’ 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated he ‘was very pleased and appreciative of the agreement 
on the part of the Saudis to provide assistance.’ !ere’s no question that the leadership of the United 
States recognizes the importance of Saudi Arabia as a close ally, and friend. !is week’s meeting be-
tween President George Bush and Crown Prince Abdullah is further testimony to this fact, as our two 
nations work hand in hand to solve some of the world’s toughest problems: "ghting terrorism, promot-
ing peace.
Paid for by the people of Saudi Arabia. Allies Against Terrorism.”16
 Four thirty-second television commercials were ready to air in May 2002, the same time Saudi Crown Prince 
Abdullah was visiting the United States.   !ey all shared a common theme with the earlier radio spot: the United States and 
Saudi Arabia are allies, regardless of what the media says [see Appendix A for transcripts of the commercials]. Getting the 
message out, however, proved to be more di$cult than expected. Major networks were reluctant to air the commercials even 
though they were being o%ered $300,000 to $400,000. A&er careful review, A&E, AMC, Bravo, History Channel, Lifetime, 
USA Network, and !e Weather Channel decided not to accept them for various reasons.17
 One representative said that Saudi Arabia was not in line with the channel’s “brand,” while another claimed the ads 
were tasteful, but they had a problem with the "nal message ([Allies] Against Terrorism). Qorvis was able to get around this 
obstacle, by hiring Creative Cable Television to purchase airtime on local stations in twenty major cities.18  !e commercials 
were getting noticed, but a joke made by Jay Leno indicates the commercials may not have been making the desired impact: 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116308/americans-support-israel-unchanged-gaza-con#ict.aspx
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“I never heard of a country doing this before. Maybe they have, and I didn’t notice it, but Saudi Arabia 
is now running a TV campaign. !ey’re trying to improve their image. !ey have a catchy slogan. !is 
is the actual slogan. ‘!e people of Saudi Arabia: Allies against terrorism.’ [...] In fact, this turned out 
to be such a good idea, a lot of other countries now running ads to boost their image. For example, like 
Canada. !is is their new slogan, ‘Like North Dakota, only without all the glitz.’ [...] !is is one of my 
favorites, Vatican City, this is their slogan - ‘hey, we didn’t see nothing.’”19
 To round out the campaign, Qorvis launched a sparse website that o"ered one page of facts about Saudi Arabia 
and an opportunity to sign up for a mailing list to receive news updates about the region. !e information focused on the 
Kingdom’s role in capturing terror suspects, its cooperation with the U.S. Treasury in #ghting money laundering, the fact that 
Osama bin Laden’s Saudi citizenship was revoked and the introduction of the Peace Initiative.20  
 A$er running for one month, Fabrizio, McLaughlin & Associates conducted a poll to measure the success of the 
campaign, and they found the campaign was not successful in convincing Americans that Saudi Arabia is a U.S. ally.21 A 
contributor to the website Kesher Talk published these poll results (which were included in an email from the #rm):
http://www.h#enberg.com/kesher/2002/05/saudi-ad-campaign-dismal-failure.html
 More concerning is that a majority of respondents felt like Saudi Arabia was exploiting 9/11 to take advantage of 
vulnerable Americans.
http://www.h#enberg.com/kesher/2002/05/saudi-ad-campaign-dismal-failure.html
19 Howard Fienberg,  “05/05/2002 - 05/11/2002,” Kesher Talk, last modi#ed November 19, 2009, accessed June 2,2011, http://www.h#enberg.com/kes-
her/2002_05_05_kesher_archive.html.
20 “About Saudi Arabia,” Internet Archive: Wayback Machine, accessed  December 2, 2009, http://web.archive.org/web/20041210203949/aboutsaudiarabia.net/
home/join.tcl.
21 Howard Fienberg,  “05/05/2002 - 05/11/2002,” Kesher Talk, last modi#ed  November 19, 2009, accessed June 2, 2011, http://www.h#enberg.com/kes-
her/2002_05_05_kesher_archive.html.
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 Saudi Arabia may always have trouble explaining themselves to the American public because it doesn’t embrace 
many of the values Americans hold dear: freedom of speech, democracy and women’s rights, for example. !is will always 
be an alienating factor in the quest for greater support. !e problem with the Kingdom’s campaign was that the message it 
tried to convey was shallow in comparison to competing messages, and avoided commenting on the values that seem to class 
with American status quo. Rather than attempting to address issues of criticism, Qorvis and the Saudi government chose to 
highlight the historic United States-Saudi Arabia friendship. !ey wanted Americans to remember the longstanding relation-
ship, but with news outlets revealing possible Saudi involvement in the attack, it was impossible to expect Americans to rely 
on past goodwill to shape their current views. If the government wanted to break through the saturation of anti-Saudi reports, 
they needed a stronger message grounded in truth. With the media chaos following 9/11, though, it’s unclear as to whether 
Americans would have believed it.
 Saudi Arabia continued for the next two years with a series of ill-advised PD and PR strategies. One even erupted 
in scandal when the FBI stormed Qorvis’ o"ces [Appendix C], the details of which would require a separate research paper. 
Expensive campaigns alone will not change perceptions, but that did not stop Saudi Arabia from trying to solve its troubles 
with cash, regardless of the glut of poll data showing the e#orts were unsuccessful [Appendix B].
“Bush Quote”
[Piano music]
On-screen text: “!e Saudi Arabians not cooperative” 
Voice: “Read the editorials, tune into Sunday morning news shows or listen to talk radio if you want opinions.”
!e rest of the quote $lls in around existing text to show full quote: “As far as the Saudi Arabians go…they’ve been nothing but 
cooperative.” 
Voice: “Listen to America’s leaders if you want the facts.”
On-screen text appears below the quote to show that George W. Bush said it on 9/24/01
On-screen text: “!e people of Saudi Arabia.  Allies against terrorism.  Paid for by the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia”
“Powell Quote”
[Di#erent piano music]
On-screen text: “Saudi Arabia has been prominent among terrorist organizations.”
Voice: “Prejudice, fear and con%icting views can distort what you see and hear.”
Rest of the quote $lls in to show: “Saudi Arabia has been prominent among the countries acting against the accounts of 
terrorist organizations.”
Voice: “Please keep your eyes, ears and especially your mind open.”
As that voice talks, it shows the Colin Powell said the quote on 11/7/01 
More text: “!e people of Saudi Arabia.  Allies against terrorism.  Paid for by the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia”
“Allies”
Voice over photo montage of prominent Saudis joined by American presidents: “We’ve been allies for more than 60 years.  
Working together to solve the world’s toughest problems.  Working together for world prosperity.  Working together to bring 
peace to the Middle East.  Working together to create a better future for us all” 
Text: “!e people of Saudi Arabia.  Allies for peace. Paid for by the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia”
“Flags”
Video of people hoisting an American !ag on a !agpole.
Voice: “In the war of terrorism, we all have a part to play.  One country has been an ally for over 60 years.”
Video now shows hands putting a Saudi !ag on a pole.
Voice: “A global leader donating more foreign aid per capita than any foreign nation.  A partner in investigating more than 150 
suspected terrorist accounts.  And a force for stabilizing oil prices during this time of war.”
More text: “!e people of Saudi Arabia.  Allies against terrorism.  Paid for by the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia” 22
#$$%&'()*#
!"#$%&"'()%*+,*)-.-/'%'+$*&+00-"&'#.%
22  “Commercials,” !e Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, accessed December 8, 2009, http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/multimedia/commercials.aspx.
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“Do you consider Saudi Arabia to be an ally of the United States, friendly but not an ally, unfriendly, or an enemy of the 
United States?”
(2000 data) CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll. Sept. 19-21, 2003. N=1,003 adults nationwide. MoE ± 3.
(2002 data) ABC News/Washington Post Poll. Jan. 24-27, 2002. N=1,507 adults nationwide. MoE ± 2.5. Field work by TNS 
Intersearch.
(All other data) CBS News Poll. Aug. 11-12, 2003. N=798 adults nationwide. MoE ± 4.
“Do you think Saudi Arabia is a country the United States can trust as an ally, or a country that we can’t trust as an ally?”
Time/CNN Poll conducted by Harris Interactive. Sept. 3-4, 2003. N=1,003 adults nationwide. MoE ± 3.
#$$%&'()*,
)*+,'*-,$&.$/"01*$23"4*"5($%04'*6$!*7'&+"68$"-1$%9$:;,-#(
9/11/2001: Terrorist Attack
9/13/2001: Burson-Marsteller hired.
10/30/2001: Prince Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz interview. 
11/2001: Qorvis Communications hired.
1/2002: Print ads: Picture of a dove with text, “Two nations, one goal,”23  and the second featured 
  a picture of an eclipse with text, “Terrorism will never dim the light of humanity.”24  
2/2002: First !omas Friedman op-ed.
2/6/02: Government acknowledges "#een hijackers were Saudi & 1st !omas Friedman op-ed is 
  published.
2/17/2002: Second !omas Friedman op-ed.
2/20/02: !omas Friedman on NewsHour.
2/21/02: Henry Siegman op-ed, among others related to the Peace Initiative.
3/27-28/2002: Arab summit in Beirut. 
4/2002: Radio spots air in thirty United States cities. 
   very critical of the Israeli army: the plan requires Israel’s “withdrawal from the Palestinian land it has 
   unjustly occupied for years.... !ere will be no more midnight raids and random searches, no more  
   violence.” 
   and neighborhoods.”
   and Justice.”  Boston Phoenix reporter Sett Gitell calls Sandler-Innocenzi, who placed the ads, and asks 
   for the contact info for the Alliance of Peace and Justice.  It turns out to be the same address as Qorvis 
   Communications.  When contacted, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia denies involvement with the spots.
4/18/2002: O$cial radio spot is "rst aired.
5/2002: TV commercials launch.
12/2/2002: Newsweek reports that money from Saudi royal family funded hijackers.  
12/2002: Accuracy in Media reports that Saudi Arabia was paying Patton Boggs $100,000 a month for lobbying 
  services.26
23  !e Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Homepage, accessed December 7, 2009, http://www.saudiembassy.net/"les/Multimedia/Commercials/Dove.pdf.
24  !e Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Homepage, accessed December 7, 2009, http://www.saudiembassy.net/"les/PDF/Eclipes.pdf.
25  Isiko%, Michael, and Evan !omas, “!e Saudi Money Trail,” Newsweek, last modi"ed December 2, 2002, http://www.newsweek.com/2002/12/01/the-saudi-
money-trail.html.
26  Irvine, Reed, and Cli% Kincaid, “Saudis Dodge Dan Burton,” Accuracy in Media (via Internet Archive), last modi"ed December 31, 2002, http://web.archive.
org/web/20060109222734/http://www.aim.org/media_monitor/A554_0_2_0_C/.
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27  Joel Mowbray, “Hiding Out: Saudi Spin Doctors Dodge U.S. Marshals,” National Review, last modi!ed December 5, 2002, http://www.nationalreview.com/
mowbray/mowbray120502.asp.
28  Philip Shenon, “"reats and Responses: Publicists; 3 Partners Quit Firm Handling Saudis’ P.R.” !e New York Times, last modi!ed December 6, 2002, http://
www.nytimes.com/2002/12/06/world/threats-and-responses-publicists-3-partners-quit-!rm-handling-saudis-pr.html.
29  Weisskopf, Michael, and Timothy J. Burger, “"e Saudis’ Secret Ads,” Time Magazine, last modi!ed January 20, 2003, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,1004071,00.html.
30  Jihane Ayed, “Saudi Arabia: Friends of America,” American University, last modi!ed April 30, 2004, http://nw08.american.edu/~zaharna/jihanesite/case_
study.html.
31  Kevin Bogardus, “Saudis Drop Big Bucks for Washington In#uence,” "e Center for Public Integrity, last modi!ed September 22, 2004, http://projects.
publicintegrity.org/oil/report.aspx?aid=382.
32  Ibid.
33  "e Washington Diplomat, accessed December 12, 2009, http://www.washdiplomat.com/04-07/a8_07_04.html.
34  Daniel Pipes, “"e Saudis’ Covert P.R. Campaign,” DanielPipes.org, last modi!ed August 10, 2004, http://www.danielpipes.org/2006/the-saudis-covert-pr-
campaign.
35  Sari Horwitz and Dan Eggen, “FBI Searches Saudi Arabia’s PR Firm,” !e Washington Post, last modi!ed December 9, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/articles/A49849-2004Dec8.html.
36  Michael Isiko$ and Mark Hosenball, “Did Saudis Deceptively Finance Ad Campaign?” Newsweek, last modi!ed December 15, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.
com/id/6719895/site/newsweek.
12/4/2002:  Top executives at Patton Boggs, Qorvis Communications and the Gallagher Group refuse to appear at 
  a congressional-committee hearing looking into the Saudi government’s involvement with the kidnapping of two 
  American children who had been held in Saudi Arabia since 1986.  "ey had previously refused to surrender !les 
  related to the lobbying work they did to prevent the American mother from rescuing the children.27
12/6/2002: New York Times reports that three partners quit Qorvis because they are “uncomfortable” doing 
  work for Saudi government.28  Most likely it is due to April 2002 radio spots connected to the “Alliance of Peace and 
  Justice.”
1/20/2003: Time Magazine runs article about secret funding of 4/2002 radio ads.29
2/2003: sixty-one percent of Americans polled had an unfavorable view of Saudi Arabia.30
6/2003: New TV commercials, but these feature individual Saudis: men and children only.
  STATES).
Late 2003: Sandler-Innocenzi runs three-week radio campaign in sixteen cities.  Total cost is $1 million.31   
  Businesswomen exchange program started.
6/2004: “Fahrenheit 9/11” is released, and is highly critical of the Saudi government.
8/2004: new radio campaign to highlight the 9-11 Commission’s !ndings that Saudi government was not behind 
  9/11.32  Two-hundred journalists invited to visit Saudi Arabia.33 
8/10/2004: Daniel Pipes, New York Sun, exposes government funding behind pro-Saudi Arabia speakers tour, 
  o$ered for free to college campuses by Qorvis.34  Results in !ve more negative news pieces regarding the funding.
8/13/2004: Saudi Arabian Embassy denies funding speaker tour in press release.  Subsequent investigations reveal 
  this claim to be false.
12/7/2004: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) raids Qorvis o%ces - “compliance inquiry” under the Foreign 
  Agents Registration Act.35  FARA requires that any public message that is sponsored by a foreign government must 
  be clearly labeled as such.
12/16/2004: Newsweek reports that FBI was investigating Qorvis because there was suspicion that Qorvis “made 
  false statements to the Justice Department and violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act—a 1938 law requiring 
  full disclosure of foreign-sponsored propaganda in the United States.”  "is is pertaining to the radio ad aired in 
  April 2002 that was supposedly sponsored by the Alliance for Peace and Justice.  "e actual Alliance for Peace and 
  Justice claimed that Qorvis used the organization’s name without its knowledge or consent.36 
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